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TOWARD AN EXPANDED "CANON" OF
NEGOTIATION THEORY:
IDENTITY, IDEOLOGICAL, AND VALUESBASED CONFLICT AND THE NEED FOR A
NEW HEURISTIC
KEVIN AvRuCH*
I. INTRODUCTION 1
Beginning in the summer of 2003, as part of the "Broad Field Project" in
conflict resolution directed by Christopher Honeyman, and in collaboration

with Professor Andrea Schneider of the Marquette University Law School, an
effort was made to elucidate a universal (or near universal) and
interdisciplinary "canon of negotiation. ' , 2 More specifically, the point was to
go beyond the existing "common core of negotiation"-topics or concepts
readily agreed to be part of any negotiation curriculum, training module, or

(indeed) theory-and see if, twenty-five years after Fisher and Ury's Getting
to Yes and Raiffa's The Art and Science of Negotiation (and forty years after
Walton and McKersie's A Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations),3 the
influx of new disciplines and the expanded sensibilities of "conflict
resolution" as it relates to negotiation have made any new topics or concepts
centrally part of a more comprehensive common core.4 The results of this
* Professor of Conflict Resolution and Anthropology, George Mason University; Associate
Director, Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, George Mason University, Arlington,
Virginia.
1. A version of this Essay was presented at the annual meeting of the International Association
for Conflict Management, June 6-9, 2004, in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. I thank co-panelist Linda
Putnam and organizers Christopher Honeyman and Andrea Schneider. In subsequent drafts, Evans
Mandes helped with additional sources in cognitive psychology. My colleagues, Marc Gopin,
Christopher Honeyman, Dan Rothbart, Richard Rubenstein, and Wallace Warfield, all read earlier
drafts closely and critically. Having satisfied none of them entirely, I thank them wholeheartedly.
2. The project is outlined more fully in the introduction of a special issue of the MarquetteLaw
Review. See Christopher Honeyman & Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Catching Up With the MajorGeneral: The Need for a "Canon ofNegotiation, " 87 MARQ. L. REV. 637 (2004).
3. ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES (Bruce Patton ed., 1981); HowARD
RAIFFA, THE ART AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION (1982); RICHARD WALTON & ROBERT
MCKERSIE, A BEHAVIORAL THEORY OF LABOR NEGOTIATIONS (1965).

4. Briefly, the six topics Honeyman and Schneider list as part of the extant common core canon
are (1) the idea of personal style or strategy in negotiation, including adversarial versus interest-
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effort, found in a special issue of the Marquette Law Review,5 indicate that
such an expanded canon is indeed suggested by interdisciplinary research and
by the involvement of practitioners of wide background and negotiation
experience. Among the twenty-five essays emerging from the special
symposium, ones that discuss the role of emotions, culture, apology, narrative
and metaphor theory, power, and identity stand out as especially good
candidates for inclusion in an expanded and canonical common core.6
This is especially true if negotiation theory and practice are ever to be
fully relevant to conflicts involving ideology, identity, or values. My goal in
this Essay is to argue why and in what ways the negotiation theory and
practice of the canonical "first-generation" are not at present wholly relevant
to these sorts of conflicts-in fact, in what ways their irrelevance is
intentional and self-inflicted-and then to suggest that a new heuristic, built
from the start around the problems of values-based conflict, can help us begin
to expand the range of relevance of negotiation theory and practice.
II. THE FIRST GENERATION HEURISTIC: RATIONAL CHOICE AND THE
BUYER-SELLER

An examination of the six topics listed by Honeyman and Schneider as
part of the already accepted canon of negotiation-for example, positions
versus interests, the notion of negotiation efficiency (as in Pareto-optimal
solutions), or problem solving-reveals its basis in the larger theory of
rational choice (or rational decision making) and the key heuristic of the
buyer-seller encounter. 7 The two-the theory and the heuristic-are of
course inextricably entangled in neo-classical economics: rational choice as
its conceptual foundation and the buyer-seller transaction as its paradigmatic
praxis. Many of the metaphors in negotiation theory and practice reflect this,
for instance, claiming or creating value (not "values"!), leaving value
("money") on the table, maximizing one's surplus, and so on. Both classic
and contemporary texts on negotiation presume throughout their analyses and
prescriptions some sort of buyer-seller interaction as the fundamental
based and problem-solving styles; (2) communication skills; (3) integrative versus distributive
negotiation;(4) ideas of zone of potential agreement (ZOPA), reservation price, and best alternative
to a negotiated agreement (BATNA); (5) use of brainstorming and other option-creating techniques
in problem-solving; and (6) the importance of preparation to efficient and productive negotiation.
See Honeyman & Schneider, supra note 2, at 643-44.
5. See Symposium, The Emerging InterdisciplinaryCanon on Negotiation, 87 MARQ. L. REV.

637 (2004).
6. Not to mention other, deeper markers of context and positionality, such as gender, culture,

and worldview.
7. Honeyman & Schneider, supra note 2, at 643-44.
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practice, 8 as did most first-generation work by experimentalists. 9 But even
ranging further afield, a classic of applied diplomacy defines diplomatic
negotiation as "essentially a mercantile art. . . . [T]he foundation of good
diplomacy is the same as the foundation of good business...."10
No one can deny the rigor, parsimony, and productiveness of the rational
choice paradigm even if, as one commentator notes, the model is not without
flaws, "not least through the real world's bloody-minded obstinacy in simply
not conforming to theory.""
The apparent, frequent disconnect between
actors' behavior as "predicted" by the paradigm and their actual behavior has
long been noted by scholars, both those working within the paradigm and
those critics outside it. 12 Perhaps the most friendly explanation for the
disconnect involves information. Rational choice requires actors to possess
rigorously valid and reliable information about many variables to arrive at a
decision. 13 In the "real world," such information is very often partial or
imperfect and hence, expectedly, decisions are far from optimally rational. 14
However, how "friendly" to the overall paradigm the information defense
is depends on where the main sources of imperfection are held to lie. If they
are in a sense external to the actor, in the situation or the environment-in the
nature of "the world"--then the defense of rational choice is robust. It is the
booming, buzzing world that is to blame, not the decision-making actor. But
if we presume instead that the information deficits are to be found mainly as a
result of something "in" the actor's own regular cognizing processes-for
instance, in a range of fairly frequent and "standard" cognitive distortionsthen the basic presumption of the cognizing actor as a rationaldecision maker
becomes a shakier one. 15 In fact, the negotiation literature is now full of
8. For a classic, see RAIFFA, supra note 3. A contemporary example is LEIGH THOMPSON, THE
MIND AND HEART OF THE NEGOTIATOR (2d ed. 2001).
9. In the Prisoners' Dilemma version of game theory, central to so much early negotiation
research in the experimentalist tradition, the "prosecutor" has something to "sell" the "prisoners,"
with clear payoffs (costs and benefits), and they must decide whether and how to "buy" it. See DEAN
G. PRUITT & PETER J. CARNEVALE, NEGOTIATION IN SOCIAL CONFLICT 19-21 (1993).
10. HAROLD NICOLSON, DIPLOMACY 71, 77 (3d ed. 7th prtg. 1973). For a view underlining the
cultural construction of such a conception, see KEVIN AVRUCH, CULTURE AND CONFLICT
RESOLUTION 39-48 (1998).
11. Jocelyn Evans, Fitting Extremism into the Rational Choice Paradigm, in GOVERNMENT
AND OPPOSITION 110 (2004).
12. 1 HERBERT A. SIMON, MODELS OF BOUNDED RATIONALITY 236 (1982).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. These can result from structural limitations in the capacity of the cognitive apparatus to
store, retrieve, or process information, or from a range of other distortion causing mechanisms, many
supported by the apparent organismic requirement for "cognitive miserliness" (or risk aversion),
resulting in such framing biases as attribution errors, just-world thinking, mirror imaging, illusory
correlations, reactive devaluation, etc.
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research, discussion, and analysis of such distortions as being part and parcel
of "regular" cognitive processing. 16 More recently, that most important
distinction-a bifurcation, actually-in the theory of mind assumed by
rational choice theory between "cognition" on the one hand and "emotion" on
the other has been questioned. Affect and cognition appear to interpenetrate
one another all the time in our thinking. 17 And if our conception of
thinking--of cognition-no longer allows the partitioning away of (messy,
irrational) emotion, then how can we assume that rational choice theory
"predicts" any actor's behavior at any time? Perhaps the value of the theory
as stipulating a set of practical, normative prescriptions remains
undiminished: When negotiating, this is how one ought to act to maximize
utilities when and if ... etc.' 8 But the value of it for prediction, describing
how people actually reach decisions in the bloody-minded real world (and,
coincidentally, for supporting its purported evolutionary roots in our
psychological past), seems much diminished. 19
These are some of the critiques that have emerged from within cognitive
psychology itself, at the foundation of rational choice theorizing. I will not
engage here the important problem of how one gets from the behavior of an
individual rational actor to the behavior of the collective-a problem that has
engaged some of the best minds in a variety of the social sciences. One can
note that it has long been recognized that "rationality" in the form of
maximizing behavior at the individual level can result in "irrationality"
(severely sub-optimal system outcomes) at the level of the collective-the
16. See PRUITT & CARNEVALE, supra note 9, at 81-102; THOMPSON, supra note 8, at 293-97.
For a discussion of such regular distortions found in international negotiation at the state level, see
ROBERT JERVIS, PERCEPTION AND MISPERCEPTION IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

(1976). An early

insight in this direction, deeply connected to peace studies and coming from the polymath and
perennially former-economist Kenneth Boulding, is THE IMAGE: KNOWLEDGE OF LIFE AND SOCIETY
(1956).
17. For a sample of recent works in this vein, see ERIC EICH ET AL., COGNITION AND EMOTION
(2000); EMOTIONS AND BELIEFS: How FEELINGS INFLUENCE THOUGHT (Nico Fridja et al. eds.,
2000); FEELING AND THINKING: THE ROLE OF AFFECT INSOCIAL COGNITION (Joseph P. Forgas ed.,

2000).
18. See THOMPSON, supra note 8, at 327.
19. Richard Rubenstein reminds me that there is another dimension to the problem over and
above imperfect information and emotional biases in decision making, namely that rational choice
theory is not as "coldly analytical" as it seems. Rubenstein argues that it is in many ways "a
disguised normative theory, instantiating certain values such as a commitment to a certain sort of
freedom and a certain sort of social order." Personal Communication with Richard E. Rubenstein,
J.D. (July 1, 2004). He adds parenthetically, "One might even be tempted to call these 'bourgeois
values' if one weren't concerned with being thought of as a Marxist dinosaur." Id. I would note that
one need not be a Marxist (nor a saurian) to recognize the normative dimension (and social
functions) of what theorists from Max Weber to Jurgen Habermas, among others, sometimes call
"technical rationality" (Zweckrationalitat). For a beginning, see MAX WEBER, THE THEORY OF
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 115 (1947).
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well-known "tragedy of the commons"; or that it is impossible to reliably
derive from aggregated individual preferences a preference set for the
collective; or that some sociological analogue of the market's "invisible hand"
will make things come out all right at the social or collective level.2 °
Other critics have come at rational choice not from the perspective of its
(problematic) sociology, but from anthropology-for example, a cultural
critique that questions the universality of utilities divorced from their
encompassing contexts of meaning and valuation. 2' Of course, the nature of
utilities is not a problem at all in neoclassical economics, since if one defines
a utility as anything desirable or valued, then one simply needs to identify
what, in a given culture, is desired or valuable, and then look around to
discover individuals striving to maximize it left and right. The adequacy of
this conception of utility for understanding other cultures has long been
questioned,22 but the questions become harder if one imagines trying to
"transact" (say, negotiate) across different "utility universes." For even if we
assume that a behavioral theory of utility maximizing holds across all
cultures, if we admit that the nature of utilities varies cross-culturally, then to
imagine intercultural "rational" transactions, we would also have to assume
that culturally-specific utilities are essentially fungible. 3
The fungiblity of utilities is (if we adopt the discourse of neoclassical
economics, at least) one issue at the heart of a theory of intercultural
negotiation--or intercultural transactions of any sort, for that matter.24 But
for the purposes of this Essay, I want to hold cultural variability constant, as it
were, and redirect our analysis of utility to the related notion of "interest,"
which is so important in contemporary and canonical negotiation theory and
practice.
In what one might legitimately call the first "Copernican revolution" of
negotiation theory and practice, the idea was put forward that if individuals
20. On the "tragedy of the commons," start with Garrett Hardin, Tragedy of the Commons, 162
SCI. 1243, 1243-48 (1968); the economist Kenneth Arrow proposes the "impossibility theorem" in
his SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (2d. ed. 1963); for skepticism directed at a
sociological "invisible hand" capable of maximally organizing social collectivities, see MICHAEL
HECHTER, PRINCIPLES OF GROUP SOLIDARITY (Brian Barry et al. eds., 1987). I have hardly
scratched the surface of this literature in rational choice and exchange theory, ranging from ecology

and economics to sociology and political science.
21. See, e.g., AVRUCH, supra note 10.
22. See generally MARSHALL SAHLINS, CULTURE AND PRACTICAL REASON (Univ. of Chicago
Press ed., 1978).
23. Aaron Wildavsky, Choosing Preferenceby Constructing Institutions:A Cultural Theory of
PreferenceFormation, 81 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 3, 4-5 (1987) (arguing against the universality and for

the cultural variability of "preferences" (utilities)).
24. Kevin Avruch, Culture, in CONFLICT FROM ANALYSIS TO RESOLUTION 140, 147 (Sandra
Cheldelin et al. eds., 2003).

572
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could be shown that most unproductive and inefficient negotiation involves
arguments around surface demands or "positions," then the act of having
parties move beyond positions to analyze their underlying interests would free
them to engage in a whole range of creative problem-solving activities. 25 Put
more formally, one could in many, though certainly not all, situations move
from distributive (fixed-pie, zero-sum) bargaining toward problem solving
and integrative (expanded-pie, positive-sum) solutions, toward the famous
"win-win" agreement.2 6 The question that some within our field have asked
is whether anything, capable of motivating behavior or social action, lies
"beneath" interests. 27 This is the crucial question if one wants to assess the
relevance of negotiation for conflicts around issues involving ideology,
identity, or values. How one answers it determines how one assesses the
adequacy of the existing "canon of negotiation," or the need for its expansion.
III. BASIC HUMAN NEEDS AND THE CRITIQUE OF INTEREST-BASED
NEGOTIATION

To imagine "motivators" underlying interests is to adopt an essentially
stratigraphic or archaeological view of the person as social actor. 28 As
elaborated by Wallace Warfield, this view yields a "layered" model of
conflict (or social transactions generally) that puts "positions" on the top
layer, at the surface. 29 Beneath these lie "interests. 3 ° Positions, often
phrased as "demands" in a negotiation, may be consciously strategic or
political, or may stem from emotionally occluded-as by anger-or
inadequately analyzed interests. Interests refer (as in Fisher and Ury) to
"real," and presumably utilities-connected, desires or wants. 31 At these two
top levels, one is operating within the bounds of the rational choice paradigm,
25. Outside of the more formal negotiation literature, the locus classicus of this argument is
Fisher and Ury's Getting to Yes. See ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETrING TO YES (2d. ed.
1991). Although I have critiqued this book from a cultural perspective in the past, it is mildly
distressing to see "win-win" turned so decisively into a clich6. I have been in the field long enough
to remember first encountering the phrase "win-win" as a genuine and thought-provoking insight.
Now one can hear it used routinely by Pentagon spokespersons or on unwary consumers in the
finance departments of Ford dealerships all over the country.
26. See id. at 56.
27. Wallace Warfield, Public Policy Conflict Resolution: The Nexus Between Culture and
Process, in CONFLICT RESOLUTION THEORY AND PRACTICE 176, 186 (Dennis J.D. Sandole & Hugo
van der Merwe eds., 1993).
28. See Kevin Avruch & Peter W. Black, Ideas of Human Nature in Contemporary Conflict
Resolution Theory, 6 NEGOTIATION J. 221, 221-28 (1990).
29. Warfield, supra note 27, at 186.

30. Id.
31. See id.
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and interest-based negotiation theory and practice suffice.32 However,
beneath interests lie "values," resulting from social learning and
enculturation. 33 At this level, Warfield says a "non-rational choice paradigm"
applies. 34 Finally, ontologically and foundationally, there lie basic human
needs; here a "bio-genetic paradigm" is called for.35
It is from the deepest level, basic human needs, that John Burton mounted
his critique of interest-based negotiation (or any third party facilitation, such
as mediation, which is merely an extension of it) as a response to what he
called "deep-rooted conflicts. 3 6
Social conflicts resulting from the
suppression of individuals' basic human needs are not negotiable or
"mediatable. ' 37 Only the satisfaction of the needs can resolve the conflict.38
The sort of problem solving called for in these cases involves the formal
analysis by the parties, aided by a panel of experts in basic human needs
theory (but not necessarily in the substance of the conflict), of how the needs
of the parties are being suppressed and of ways the parties may achieve
mutual satisfaction of them.39
32. Id.
33. Id. at 187.
34. Id. at 186.
35. Id. An important caveat to all these sorts of models, especially hierarchical ones, is that
interests and values are never uniformly distributed in social groups-some may hold interests and
values that others in the group do not-and that interests and values, even if socially shared, are
always differentially internalized by different individuals. For some individuals, to take an example,
the value of"Christian charity" may be held, but only at the level of cultural clich6; other individuals
might organize their whole lives around it. See AVRUCH, supra note 10, at 16-20 (discussing how
these points are generalized to culture).
36. JOHN BURTON, CONFLICT: RESOLUTION AND PREVENTION 15 (1990).

37. Id. at 34.
38. Id. at 242.
39. See generally BURTON, supra note 36. Burton assumed that one party-the weaker,
disenfranchised, or oppressed one-suffers disproportionately suppressed needs and that its social
agitation "causes" the conflict, with the stronger party (often the State) then responding repressively
and violently, leading to escalation and conflict spirals. Id. at 50. But Burton always recognized that
the stronger party has irrepressible needs too-often around "security"-and these must be addressed
as well if resolution is to occur. Id. at 34. A striking example of this was Burton's arguing
throughout the 1970s, 1980s, and early 1990s that any nonviolent solution to South African apartheid
and the transition to majority black rule would necessitate addressing white, and particularly
Afrikaner, concerns. Id. In that era, in the liberal to radical university, peace studies, and conflict
resolution settings in which he moved, this was a politically incorrect and for some a distasteful
position to espouse. Always the iconoclast, political correctness of any sort was never Burton's
concern. Nevertheless, most "experts" predicted the end of apartheid in a racial bloodbath, borne
mostly by whites, and a few in radical circles were prepared to welcome it. Now reflect on the
genius of Nelson Mandela's guiding South Africa's nonviolent transition to majority black rule and
the end of Apartheid-precisely, how the fears of white South Africans were addressed, materially
and symbolically-and the wisdom of Burton's insights about protecting the needs of apparently
stronger parties in deep-rooted conflicts cannot be ignored. There are lessons here for the resolution
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While Burton's conception of conflict resolution was certainly a critique
of interest-based negotiation, he did not so much desire to "expand" the canon
of negotiation as to replace it entirely as a technique for resolving deep-rooted
conflicts. This is because basic human needs "trumped" mere interests, and
therefore an entirely different practice or technology of conflict resolution
(the "analytical problem solving workshop") was called for .40 Burton
sidestepped what I earlier referred to as the problem of the "fungibility" of
utilities, or the closely related notion of interests, by postulating the primary,
ontological power of basic human needs. 41 But since he argued that these
needs were indeed ontological-the same everywhere and universally
shared-they were by definition also transcultural, and the whole problem of
transactions across what I have called "utility universes" never arises.4 2
Unlike interests, one does not have to devise integrative solution sorts of
trade-offs or other manipulations (bridging, logrolling, alternative
compensations, etc.) between different species of needs, since (a) one in any
case cannot-all the needs imperiously require satisfaction eventually; and (b)
every individual has the same set of them. Thus, Burton would certainly
agree that the essential heuristic of rational choice and interest-based
negotiation, the buyer-seller, is grossly inappropriate for fashioning a
resolution to deep-rooted conflicts; but this is because basic human needs,
being 4given-literally
inalienable-can never be "bought," "traded," or
"sold. 3 Insofar as we need a new heuristic here, it would be, as Warfield
suggests, something in line with a "bio-genetic paradigm., 44
The
microsociological rationality of the calculating, maximizing individual of neoclassical economics is somehow to be replaced by the perduring evolutionary
rationality of the adaptive, inclusive-fitness seeking genome.
IV. VALUES-BASED CONFLICTS, INTERESTS, RIGHTS, AND POWER

Sandwiched between the presumed universal comparability of utilities,
opening the way for creative problem solving at the level of interests, and the
bedrock universality of basic human needs, lies the layer Warfield calls
"values. 45 Inculcated in individuals through socialization and enculturation,
of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict (especially for those more vehement critics of Israel or Zionism

who tend toward demonification), among others.
40. Id. at 204.
41. Id. at 23.
42. Id. at211.
43. Id. at 39-40.
44. Warfield, supra note 27, at 186.
45. Id.
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"values" in this scheme cover a wide range of notions, including such ideas as
ideology, beliefs, or worldview, which are not at all identical. 46 So the term is
being used here, imperfectly, as a kind of shorthand.4 7 Instead of being
linked, through the notion of utility, to what is useful, desired, or preferred,
values are linked (through a different calculus?) to what is deemed good and
true. Warfield also argues that at this level some sort of "non-rational choice
paradigm" is the appropriate one for understanding social transactionsconflict or its resolution, for example. 48 At the least, values-based conflicts
may resist the sort of rational, problem-solving negotiation practices that often
and demonstrably work well to address conflicts involving competing
interests. In the past, many such values-based conflicts have been labeled as
"intractable," especially if they involve basic incompatibilities between the
parties at the deepest levels of worldview, or perceived threats to personal or
group identity.49 In any case, if a negotiation "canon" is to be expanded at all,
it would be at the point of addressing values-based conflicts.
A first step is, I believe, the formulation of a different heuristic for
orienting oneself to these sorts of conflicts; different, that is, from the buyerseller metaphor that is central to interest-based negotiation theory, research,
and practice. Tversky and Kahneman, and Lakoff and Johnson, among
others, have pointed to the ways in which heuristics play an important role in
decision making, and metaphors in cognition and perception generally. 50 The
metaphor or heuristic of buyer-seller is hardly in itself "value-neutral" in this
regard. Consider, for example, how it orients us to the notion of "trust" in
negotiation. Discussing the (canonical) concept of "reservation point,"essentially the quantification of one's BATNA-Leigh Thompson assesses
the wisdom of one party revealing her reservation point to the other, in part
thereby demonstrating "good faith and trust" in the other party. 51 Thompson
46. Id. at 187.
47. Values are connected closely to matters of ideology and identity, and, therefore, valuesbased conflicts are connected closely to ideological and identity conflicts. However, to keep the
discussion that follows relatively simple, I will focus on values only and leave the nature of their
connection to the latter two unspecified.
48. Id. at 186-87.
49. See John Agnew, Beyond Reason: Spatial and Temporal Sources of Ethnic Conflicts, in
INTRACTABLE CONFLICTS AND THEIR TRANSFORMATION 25 (Louis Kriesberg et al. eds., 1989);

Susan Hunter, The Roots of Environmental Conflict in the Tahoe Basin, in INTRACTABLE CONFLICTS
AND THEIR TRANSFORMATION 13 (Louis Kriesberg et al. eds., 1989); Terrell A. Northup, The
Dynamic of Identity in Personal and Social Conflict, in INTRACTABLE CONFLICTS AND THEIR

TRANSFORMATION 55 (Louis Kriesberg et al. eds., 1989).
50. GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY (Univ. of Chicago Press
ed., 1980); AMOS TVERSKY & DANIEL KAHNEMAN, JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS
AND BIASES (1982).
51. THOMPSON, supra note 8, at 43.
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writes, prescriptively: "Negotiation is not an issue of trust; it is an issue of
strategy. The purpose of negotiation is to maximize your surplus, so why
create a conflict of interest with the other party by 'trusting' them with your
reservation point?" 52 Given the underlying and orienting heuristic, this seems
a perfectly reasonable, indeed rational, way to structure a buyer-seller
relationship and approach negotiation within one.5 3 But if one is negotiating
with another in the context of a values-based conflict, ought the matter of
"trust" be dismissed so emphatically? If one thinks not, then what sort of
heuristic can move us away from thinking of negotiation in a "maximize your
surplus," buyer-seller modality?
Before suggesting such a heuristic, it is worthwhile briefly to examine
how rational choice and interest-based negotiation theorists have themselves
addressed values-based conflicts. The two main ways pull in rather different
directions.
First, one can simply deny that any significantly different sorts of
"motivators" underlie interests. This is the tack taken by Dean Pruitt and

Sung Hee Kim, who see "interests underlying interests," although they do
agree that interests cluster into "hierarchical trees," the deepest or most
"basic" level of which consist of such Burtonian basic human needs as
identity, security, justice, or self-esteem.54 However, they do not agree with
needs theorists "about the need to draw a sharp distinction between interestbased conflicts and needs-based" ones.5 5 Negotiation of what we would call
values-based conflicts in this view consists of the parties moving "up" or
"down" their respective interest trees until they reach mutually bridgeable
ones.
The second tack is very different. Agreeing that values-based conflicts
are rarely if ever amenable to interest-based negotiations, these analysts
52. Id.
53. Granted, though I suspect that another reason for this assertion, regarding trust in general, if
not disclosing one's BATNA, has to do with the presumption (particularly in simulation or
experimentalist settings) that buyer-seller negotiations are one-off, "cash-and-carry," non-repetitive
encounters. If one assumes a continuing relationship, even in strictly surplus-maximizing, costbenefit encounters, then perhaps the notion of trust looms larger-it becomes another utility. The
one-off nature of the buyer-seller heuristic is of course not a necessary element, but a commonly
assumed one. More broadly, Thompson is forgetting that even the most coldly rational or
economistic negotiation between buyer and seller depends upon the existence of some shared norms;
for example, a consensual legal framework that valorizes contracts. In this sense, one might assume
there is a basic level of trust in "the system" if not in the (other) individual. Finally, markets in other
cultures may well parse trust in different ways. See Clifford Geertz, Suq: The BazaarEconomy in
Sefrou in Meaning and Order, in MOROCCAN SOCIETY 123 (1979).
54. DEAN G. PRUITT & SUNG H. KIM, SOCIAL CONFLICT: ESCALATION, STALEMATE, AND

SETTLEMENT 199-200 (3d ed. 2004).
55. Id. at 200 n.9.
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suggest that two other modes of settlement or resolution may be called for,
one based upon power, the other upon rights.5 6 Both may be deployed in the
framework of a "negotiation," although such negotiations rarely present the
same opportunities, as do interest-based ones, for creative or "pie-expanding"
problem solving. Power implies coercion of one sort or another, whether
deployed as threat or exercised in some sort of contest-the outer limits of
"negotiation." Rights refer to standards of legitimacy, justice, or fairness,
whether formally codified in a contract or generally understood in some
cultural context. (The context may vary in scope. One may speak of an
organizational culture where salary is "rightfully" or "justifiably" tied to
seniority, or of culture more broadly, where "justice before the law" is the
right of all. Rights may be generally socially accepted, but they are often not,
and contested as well, frequently looping us back to power.)
In contrast to Pruitt and Kim, who believe all motivators, including values
and basic human needs, can be collapsed into the category of interest,
Thompson and Ury appear to leave the field of values-based conflicts open to
alternative paradigms, based on power and rights.5 7 In the former case, the
existing canon is therefore probably sufficient; in the latter case, it is probably
irrelevant. In addition, the role of negotiation aimed at achieving integrative
solutions is greatly circumscribed in rights and power settings. Rights
conflicts are most often settled through stipulative or adjudicatory processes
of one sort or another, usually producing winners and losers. Moreover, the
interests of individuals (the starting point of the rational choice, interest-based
heuristic) are often supplanted here by the more distal and abstract interests of
the corporation, society, or the state. Meanwhile, power-based negotiations
may reduce merely to communication between the parties (metaphorical or
not) about the terms of ceasefire or surrender-with correspondingly little
scope for creative brainstorming or elaborate problem solving. 58 In addition,
power-based settlements are notorious for their less-than-optimal
sustainability, engendering as they do resentment and vengefulness-the
seeds of the next round of conflict. 9
When faced with values-based conflicts, then, the choice with regard to
negotiation at present seems to be between presuming that such conflicts are
not qualitatively different from other sorts of interest-based conflicts, even if
more ingenuity in moving "up and down" the hierarchical interest trees is
56. See THOMPSON, supra note 8; WILLIAM URY ET AL., GETTING DISPUTES RESOLVED:
DESIGNING SYSTEMS TO CUT THE COSTS OF CONFLICT 7-9 (1988).

57. Id. at 9.
58. Perhaps the paradigmatic negotiation in both rights and power (more the latter!) is the pleabargain-the prisoners' dilemma in a different light.
59. AVRUCH, supra note 10, at 48-50.
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called for; or presuming that the notion of interests no longer productively
applies, and negotiation itself constricts to power-plays or rights contests. For
myself, I am doubtful that deeply held values or needs can be lumped with
other sorts of interests, but I am reluctant to leave the field thus open only to
power and rights. Might it be that what we need, precisely, is an expanded
canon of negotiation? Certainly some thinking in this direction has already
occurred with respect to power: consider Kenneth Boulding's Three Faces of
Power60 (only one of which is coercive) as an important step in this direction.
Several of the articles in the Marquette Law Review referred to earlier carry
Boulding's ideas forward and suggest that power considerations beyond
coercion or force be assimilated and added to the negotiation canon. 61
And what about rights? If one thinks of such commonly conceived rights
as fairness, equity, or justice, it seems as if we are very close to the domain of
"values" as this is commonly conceived as well. Can we imagine an
expanded canon of negotiation capable of addressing these sorts of conflicts?
If so, I think we have to begin by conceptualizing a heuristic for negotiation
different from that of buyer-seller. If Tversky and Kahneman are correct
about the orienting role heuristics play in our thinking, then the purpose of a
new heuristic is to orient us away from thinking of negotiation predominantly
in terms of utility-talk and rational choice, and towards a sense of it more
open to conflicts around values, needs, and worldviews. 62
V. A NEW HEURISTIC FOR NEGOTIATION
If one thinks about a deep values conflict in our contemporary society,
then something like abortion or capital punishment is immediately suggested.
But if we want a heuristic similar in type to buyer-seller, focused
(microsociologically) on dyadic actors in a specified and delimited decision
making situation, consider the following:
A couple, each deeply religious but coming from very different religious
traditions, has a child. Religion is extremely important to both of them, and
while each "respects" the tradition of the other, a decision must be made as
to which tradition the child will be affiliated with and raised in. How do they
go about "negotiating"this?
Perhaps the first thing to note about this-let us call it the two-religions60. KENNETH E. BOULDING, THREE FACES OF POWER (1989).

61. Honeyman & Schneider, supra note 2; see also Jayne Docherty, Culture and Negotiation:
Symmetrical Anthropologyfor Negotiations, 87 MARQ. L. REV. 711 (2004); Christopher Honeyman,
The Physics of Power, 81 MARQ. L. REv. 872 (2004); Russell Korobkin, Heuristicsand Biases at the
BargainingTable, 87 MARQ. L. REv. 795 (2004).
62. See LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 50; TVERSKY & KAHNEMAN, supra note 50.
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heuristic is how, by its own limitations, it highlights the robustness and appeal
of buyer-seller. For one thing, buyer-seller has wide, virtually universal,
applicability as an example of a decision making situation. Buyers meet
sellers in different sorts of markets all the time and everywhere, and although
the nature of these markets is hardly the same, the essential roles are
remarkably constant and recognizable. 6 3 In stark contrast, the two-religions
heuristic is imaginable only in an essentially liberal society in which religion
is culturally constituted as a matter of individual "conscience," privatized and
free of coercive pressures from larger social groups-at least larger than each
of the couple's immediate family. 64 In many of the world's societies, today
and historically, this scenario would make no sense. It is, compared to buyerseller, narrowly historically and culturally contingent.
Accepting the cross-cultural constriction of the heuristic (not a small
thing), how would rational choice, buyer-seller, thinking apply? Simple
solutions of the "fair divisibility" sort are immediately objectionable.
Children (as the great arbitrator Solomon pointed out in a much cited
precedent) ought not be divided in half. A child cannot reasonably be raised
in one tradition in the months that end in thirty-one days, and in the other in
the months that do not. Shall the couple agree to alternate traditions with each
new child? Raise boys in one and girls in the other? Pick a third religion
alien to both of them? It is difficult to imagine the parties maximizing mutual
"value" if each believes that only his or her religious tradition will lead the
child to full heavenly reward (or whatever soteriological goal is desired).
Perhaps they should raise the child simultaneously in both traditions, leaving
65
the ultimate decision up to the child when he or she reaches legal majority?
It is also difficult to imagine a "power" process being applied to this
decision without great damage to the relationship, and perhaps eventually to
the child as well. -If, however, power is conceived beyond the bonds of the
dyadic relationship and generalized to society, then one can imagine a rational
decision being made to raise the child in the tradition that is more closely
identified with the power structure of the society, for the future advancement
and "benefit" of the child. This, indeed, is why Moses Mendelssohn was a
63. "Recognizable" but not necessarily "identical." Other markets in other places ("cultures")
provide evidence of this. See Geertz, supra note 53. Among other things-pace Leigh Thompson
on "trust"-Geertz writes of buyer-seller interaction in the suq: "Bargaining does not operate in
purely pragmatic, utilitarian terms, but is hedged in by deeply felt rules of etiquette, tradition, and
moral expectation." Id. at 222.
64. Other features of this social setting may include notions of gender equality (for
heterosexual couples), egalitarianism, the absence of an official state-sponsored religion, or at least
the effective legal separation of church and state.
65. This "solution" is the one most in keeping with the highly individualized and religiously
privatized nature of the society itself. It is rational. Does it make any sense to you?
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great Jewish philosopher in the Austro-Hungarian Empire in the eighteenth
century, and his grandson, Felix, a great Christian composer in the nineteenth.
But note that we have now clearly turned religion into an interest, amenable
to utility-talk. History is certainly replete with examples of this.6 6 In fact,
under some circumstances, values do get treated like interests and negotiated
as one would negotiate interests. This happens in the United States Congress
or parliaments or in democratic electoral politics generally-not to mention in
labor-management relations-more often than not. But if we insist on
preserving the genuine and deeply held values-the non-utilitarian-nature of
the couples' thinking (and feeling) as they make their decision, then choosing
on the basis of secular, 67"profane," and interest-based advantage should be
offensive to both parties.
If power is to be applied only problematically in this situation, what of
rights? In one sense rights are inextricably embedded in the heuristic, as
implied when I specified the kind of culture, society, or polity in which this
scenario is even imaginable. 68 But if there exists no set of rights-objective,
legitimate, widely recognized, and shared standards-available to help the
parties make their choice (even if rights make their choice possible), then are
we thrown back to power?
Is this decision negotiableat all?
VI. CONCLUSION: A NEW CANON FOR A NEW HEURISTIC?

I do not, in fact, have a very decisive or satisfying answer to this question.
But the raising of it brings us back to the starting point of the Essay, the call
for a new, expanded canon of negotiation theory, research, and practice. I do
think the two-religions heuristic demonstrates the limitations of the older
canon, based on rational choice and buyer-seller, in approaching these sorts of
conflicts. It is not clear to me, pace Pruitt and Kim, how we can conceive of
66. "Paris is worth a Mass," said Henri IV, famously, as the Protestant king converted to
Catholicism to take the city in 1594. See HUGH ROSS WILLIAMSON, PARIS IS WORTH A MASS

(1971). Religion as interest is widely to be found in the politics, especially urban, of multiconfessional societies: The mayor is an X, the city council president is a Y, different wards have their
predetermined religious or ethnic representative, etc. One can even try to run a nation-state in this
way, for example, Lebanon. (Thus, "rational choice.")
67. Among my (American) colleagues who read and responded critically to this essay, it was
the colleague who is most committed to his faith and cultural or ethnic identity who was the most
unhappy with the two-religions scenario as a basis for much of anything.
68. In contrast, the millet system of the Ottoman empire protected the prerogatives of minority
religious communities by allowing them jurisdiction over legal matters involving personal statusmarriage, divorce, adoption, etc. 7 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ISLAM 61 (Hamilton A.R. Gibb et al. eds.,

1993). But all matters arising between communities, especially those involving Muslims, fell under
the jurisdiction of Muslim qadis and courts: the clear intersection of rights with power. Id.
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the religious values of these parties (they are not horse-trading or logrolling
Congressional Democrats and Republicans, after all) in any productive way
reducible to interests. 69 Nor does it seem to me that identifying or
acknowledging a deeply rooted basic human need around religious meaning,
affiliation, belief, or spirituality, pace Burton-that both parties indeed
share-points us toward decision or solution. I can see that based upon the
older canon of negotiation we might well call this conflict fully "intractable"
and non-negotiable. The advice of a third party to this couple might then be
to forego bringing children into their relationship entirely--or rethink the
sustainability, if not the value, of the relationship. Hardly win-win.
But if new heuristics guide or orient our thinking about problems in new
ways, then what might the two-religions heuristic suggest? The list of topics
for a new "common core" in an expanded canon of negotiation suggested by
many of the authors in the Marquette Law Review include subjects under
apology, culture, emotions, ethics, identity, power (beyond coercion),
narrative, and metaphor.7i If the older canon seems too restricted to imagine
negotiating the two-religions conflict under it, it is equally difficult to imagine
a negotiation-were one possible-that did not include recourse to some of
the subjects listed above. But how?
One important question raised here is under what circumstances does the
interest-based paradigm work or fail when confronted by values-based
conflicts-when are values reducible or irreducible to interests? I think we
need a more nuanced-processual and dynamical-way of describing
negotiations in values-based conflict. Wallace Warfield, for example,
suggests that we should not so much see interests and values in a hierarchical
relationship where one "trumps" the other-my earlier game metaphor-as to
understand the ability of oppositional parties in negotiations of various
dimensions to engage in what he describes as "rapid shifting" between
"negotiable interests and so-called non-negotiable values., 72 Reflecting on
his own conflict resolution training and workshop practice in post-genocide
Rwanda, Warfield writes: "Thus Rwandans (Hutus and Tutsis) were able to
negotiate around interests in a scenario that dealt with organizational conflict
because organizational structure and culture provided negotiators a bridge.
Whereas, those same parties, when it came to fundamental issues of genocide
and forgiveness, struggled to find a common ground., 73 He suggests the need
69. See PRUITT & KiM, supra note 54, at 199-200.
70. BURTON, supranote 36, at 15.
71. Honeyman & Schneider, supra note 2, at 645-48.
72. Personal Communication with Wallace Warfield, Associate Professor of Conflict Analysis,
George Mason University (June 30, 2004).
73. Id.
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for heuristic and models that depict not static layers, but "shifting
...
74
boundaries driven by situation and perhaps other characteristics.
The really hard work, not even attempted in this Essay, is not to devise a
new heuristic, but having proposed one to develop it in order to imagine the
possibility for negotiation of values-based conflicts now deemed intractable,
beyond the sometimes uncertain remedies of rights and power. The tworeligions heuristic, given its limitations, may in the end serve only to remind
us that these sorts of deeply embedded conflicts demand, on the part of
theorists and practitioners alike, greater attention to understanding the
dynamics of values-based negotiations (in the area of practice), and for
theorists, greater attention to axiology in general and the nexus between
values and identity-in the end hinted at but unexplored here-in particular.

74. Id.

